

## **8.20 PBS SR-0020 Safeguards and Security**

### **8.20.1 Background**

Savannah River Site (SRS) encompasses 310 square miles and has a workforce of approximately 13,000. As the result of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) was left with a large inventory of nuclear materials in various forms and stored in many locations. The Safeguards and Security (S&S) program ensures appropriate levels of protection for SRS facilities against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM); acts of radiological sabotage; espionage; theft or loss of classified matter; theft or loss of government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts to national security, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment.

### **8.20.2 End State**

This project will continue through EM target completion date of FY 2025. S&S requirements for the EM program will ramp down as facilities close through FY 2019. From FY 2020 through FY 2025 S&S support for EM will consist of site access control and property protection. Beginning in FY 2026, remaining site S&S support will be transferred to another DOE program office.

### **8.20.3 Scope and Description**

The S&S program provides security for nuclear materials and facilities at SRS to ensure the protection of people and the environment. The program provides for a security police force to control access at the perimeter barricades and onsite facilities; maintain command and alarm centers; maintain response capability for weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, nuclear or explosive); perform onsite and offsite transportation escort functions; provide law enforcement functions; monitor intrusion detection and access control systems; and provide and maintain a Special Response Team.

The S&S program also provides technical support and documentation to manage an integrated system for the protection of nuclear materials, classified information, site property and personnel. The Nuclear Material, Control, and Accountability (MC&A) program ensures SNM accounting in accordance with DOE requirements, and support ongoing and new risk reduction, material consolidation, and nuclear material hold up removal activities (e.g., residual materials in process equipment). These activities provide assurance that SNM is properly controlled and accounted for at all times. The Information Security program ensures that material and documents that may contain sensitive or classified information are identified, reviewed, appropriately marked and protected from unauthorized disclosure, and ultimately destroyed in a timely manner. The Personnel Security program encompasses those activities necessary to ensure only authorized personnel access the site and ensure adequate control for areas within the site. The Cyber Security program ensures the protection of sensitive or classified information that is electronically transmitted.

## 8.20.4 Responsibilities

The DOE-SR Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services (OSSES) oversees and manages safeguards, security and emergency service activities at SRS. This organization formulates and executes policies and programs in the areas of physical, information, internal, and personnel security; classification and declassification; computer security; technical surveillance countermeasures; foreign travel; protective force; and MC&A. In addition, DOE provides direct management of the perimeter security upgrade construction projects, which are performed under separate contracts, outside those identified below.

The SRS has two contractors that perform S&S activities. Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) provides protective forces and law enforcement. The site management and operations contractor, Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) provides security system maintenance, personnel security, MC&A, cyber security, information security and vulnerability assessment programs. Within WSRC, the responsibility for this work scope resides with the Field Support Services Business Unit.

## 8.20.5 Schedule

The security requirements for the lifecycle baseline are based on the following schedule:

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Deinventory of Nuclear Material Complete</u>
FB Line	FY 2005
HB Line/H Canyon	FY 2011
Building 235-F	FY 2014
K Area Material Storage	FY 2017
L Area	FY 2020

## 8.20.6 Resources

The cost profile for this PBS is TBD.

The FY 2005 budget did not include any funding to address the new Design Basis Threat (DBT) guidance. The profile above includes the cost of requirements to comply with recently revised DBT guidance beginning in FY 2005. Preliminary lifecycle estimates for the implementation of the DBT guidance will be included in the FY 2006 budget.

The revised PMP baseline reflects the acceleration of FB Line deinventory from FY 2006 to FY 2005.

#### Technology Needs

Technologies will be required for an effective DBT implementation. New technologies have the potential to significantly reduce the lifecycle cost associated with the DBT implementation. The primary costs associated with sustaining security posture are the increased Pro Force staffing levels. These levels are primarily driven by the need for effective interruption and neutralization of adversary forces at target locations. Avenues for significant cost savings may be found in:

- § reduce the number of targets locations (consolidate or eliminate)
- § enhance Pro Force survivability
- § allow better tactical deployment.

### **8.20.7 Key Assumptions, Agreements, Trade-offs, and Risk Management**

#### Key Assumptions

The following key assumptions have been used as the basis for the lifecycle cost and schedule development:

- § The site S&S footprint will be minimized consistent with nuclear materials storage and disposition schedules developed in the respective PBSs.
- § New technologies will be used to minimize the reliance on security manpower.
- § Site security upgrades ("9/11 projects") will be completed.
- § Improvements described in the Implementation Plan for the DBT guidance will be completed, and upgrades implemented by September 30, 2006.
- § HB Line will not be an S&S Category I facility.

#### Agreements

The following agreements are drivers for this project:

- § Site S&S Plan will be completed per agreed upon implementation plan schedules
- § DBT Implementation Plan will be completed by the end of FY 2006.

#### Risks

Key risks identified for this PBS are as follows:

- § DBT schedule is dependent on completion of Vulnerability Assessments (VA) and obtaining required funding in FY 2006
- § Deinventory schedules for facilities directly affect S&S lifecycle costs
- § Support for 3013 Security Upgrades was redirected in FY 2004, and was not part of the FY 2005 S&S budget. Additional support in FY 2005 and FY 2006 may impact other S&S work scope
- § The Protection Strategy at SRS could be significantly changed depending on the outcome of the DBT Annex Special Evaluation Team. If the SRS security posture becomes more restrictive, the cost estimate for DBT implementation and recurring costs could increase significantly
- § Obsolescence in equipment and facilities may require large-scale replacements.

#### Alternatives, Trade-offs, and Risk Management

Mitigating factors being utilized by the Office of Safeguards and Security and Emergency Services to assure full implementation of new DBT guidance include the acceleration of VA work into FY 2004 and optimizing integration within the EM complex and the S&S program to ensure scope acceleration whenever feasible.

## 8.20.7 Performance Monitoring

### 8.20.8.1 HQ Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring of this PBS at the HQ level is completed primarily through use of the Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budget System (IPABS) system. Actual cost, schedule, and performance data are collected for each PBS and compared to the established baseline. All elements of the lifecycle baseline are under EM-HQ configuration control.

OA Reviews are conducted bi-annually by the Office of Assessment to ensure S&S compliance with DOE Orders, Laws, Plans, and Directives.

#### **Budget Milestones:**

<b>Budget Milestone:</b>	<b>Proposed Date:</b>
Site security upgrades (“9/11” projects)	9/30/06
DBT implementation	9/30/06
Facility-specific security forces reduced	9/30/19
Site security transferred to new landlord	10/1/25

### 8.20.8.2 Site Monitoring and Evaluation

A Joint Review is conducted monthly by the S&S program. WSRC, WSI, and DOE staff (program and financial) meet to discuss S&S ongoing initiatives, planned actions, and issue resolution.

Annual security surveys and management walkdowns are also conducted to assess performance.

Refer to Section 4.3 for additional detail on site performance monitoring processes.